“privacy for the weak transparency for the powerful” – No BigData for BigBrother.
that’s the slogan of internet Cypherpunks.
- And it is legitimate, yes the tor anonymization network can also be misused for evil (like almost any technology can, Einstein could not imagine that nuclear technology could also be used for evil) for extracting money by ransom-ware (let my virus encrypt your hard-disk and then ask for bitcoins in exchange for the decryption-key) and of course such crimes should be prosecuted. But maybe this has to do a lot with CONSCIOUSNESS and the economic model that we (try) to live.
- If you think about spying-agencies – creating private companies that do all the dirty and against the constitution “spying on the mass of the people” – for profit – for the private sector – for the banks and “investors” – for power – for control over the masses.
- BigData for BigBrother.
- perfecting control of the masses – in the “tradition” of Hitler, Stalin, Mao.
- “We know what you think, what you buy, what you vote – can’t say anything against efficiency, can you?”
- Efficiency is NOT everything a society needs
- what about resilience?
- Studying natural ecosystems resilience is 3x more important than efficiency for a system to not collapse in catastrophe.
- what about responsibility?
- what about sustainability?
- what about creativity?
- what about resilience?
Some people estimate that if only 20% of all traffic (instant messaging, calls, mail, browsing, up and downloads) would be (end-to-end?) encrypted – the surveillance state can not longer operate.
No wonder – governments and agencies hate TOR and are working with universities (i guess they just wanna research if it’s safe to use) on compromising it, like hacking it’s servers and binaries.
[tor-dev] Paper on how DNS affects Tor’s anonymity
Philipp Winter phw at nymity.ch
Wed Sep 28 15:35:49 UTC 2016
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My colleagues and I published a (not yet peer-reviewed) research paper on how DNS affects Tor's anonymity. The key parts of our work are: - We measure the DNS setup of exit relays over time, showing that at times Google got to see almost 40% of DNS requests coming out of Tor. - We show how website fingerprinting attacks can be augmented with observed DNS requests, resulting in precise attacks for unpopular websites. - Similar to the "Users Get Routed" work, we simulate the impact of our attack at Internet-scale using the TorPS simulator. The PDF is available online: <https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf> Our project page has code, data, and replication instructions: <https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/>
Mirror download of that paper: the-effect-of-dns-on-tors-anonymity.pdf
“Exit nodes can either make DNS lookups themselves or outsource them to a third party resolver. Many choose to use their ISP but about a third of all the observed DNS requests coming from the Tor network went to a single entity;
Google’s popular 188.8.131.52 resolver – a situation the researchers describe as “alarming”.
What you can do
This new attack shouldn’t send anyone running for the hills – if your adversaries aren’t already in a position to conduct correlation attacks this probably won’t help them much.
In the short term, the authors of the paper would like to see the Tor project fix a bug that causes Tor to cache DNS entries for 60 seconds regardless of the DNS entry’s TTL (Time To Live).
In the longer term they’re also calling for Tor to implement DNS lookups over TLS (which would encrypt traffic between exit nodes and DNS resolvers), and suggest that defenses against website fingerprinting attacks in general should be “an important long-term goal.’
They also offer the following advice for exit node operators:
… exit relay operators should avoid public resolvers such as Google and OpenDNS. Instead, they should either use the resolvers provided by their ISP, or run their own, particularly if the operator’s ISP already hosts many other exit relays. Local resolvers can further be optimized to minimize information leakage, by (for example) enabling QNAME minimization
Site operators worried about their users’ anonymity can bypass the DNS system entirely, and stay within the Tor network, by running their site as a hidden service.”
One of the developers said:
"Tor clients do not cache dns responses from exit relays, so the security impact on users should be limited."